

## Message Text

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ACTION SCI-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11

RSC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PA-04 PRS-01

ACDA-19 CIAE-00 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 FEA-02

SS-20 SP-03 PM-07 DODE-00 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /176 W

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O P 231744Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4427

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN PRIORITY

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

USMISSION USUN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 4657

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, PFOR, IAEA, IN

SUBJ: INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST - REACTION BY IAEA DG EKLUND

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR TAPE

1. IAEA DG EKLUND CALLED ME IN YESTERDAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN TO VIENNA TO DISCUSS IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN UNDERGROUND EXPLOSION WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. EKLUND HAD BEEN IN SWEDEN TO RECEIVE HONORARY DEGREE AND RETURNED TO VIENNA VIA MOSCOW AT SOVIET INITIATIVE--A SCHEDULE WHICH HAD BEEN WORKED OUT PRIOR TO DATE OF EXPLOSION.

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2. EKLUND EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN AT APPARENT LACK OF

PUBLIC REACTION BY MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. IN HIS MOSCOW TALKS ON MAY 20 WITH MOROKHOV (FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF STATE COMMITTEE ON UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY) HE HAD HEARD NO EXPRESSED CONCERN ON THE EFFECTS ON THE NPT OF THE INDIAN ACTION. MOROKHOV APPEARED INTERESTED ONLY IN THE QUESTION OF VENTING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY. HE MENTIONED PEACEFUL NATURE OF INDIAN EXPLOSION AND GAVE NO INDICATION THAT SOVS INTEND TAKE CRITICAL PUBLIC POSTURE. AFTER RECEIVING THIS MUTED SOVIET REACTION, EKLUND SAID HE WAS DOUBLY DISTRESSED TO FIND THE US UNABLE TO GO BEYOND THE BLAND COMMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN REPORTED TO HIM FROM THE CCD MEETING IN GENEVA. SO FAR, NON OF NPT DEPOSITORY POWERS HAD REACTED IN ANY WAY HE WOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED, LEAVING CANADA AND A FEW OTHERS TO PROVIDE THE STRONG RESPONSE WHICH THE SITUATION CLEARLY WARRANTED.

3. EKLUND REMINDED ME OF HIS INCREASING CONCERNS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE OF THE NPT, AS REFLECTED FOR EXAMPLE IN ITALIAN FOOTDRAGGING ON RATIFICATION AND THE APPARENT INABILITY OF JAPAN TO REACH A DECISION TO RAFTIFY. THIS LACK OF MOMENTUM WAS AGGRAVATED BY THE INCREASING ATTACKS BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, INCLUDING SOME PARTY TO THE NPT, ON THE RISING COST AND QUESTIONED EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AS WELL AS THE INCREASING DOUBTS BEING EXPRESSED BY MANY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PARTIES TO THE NPT AS TO THE VALUE THE TREATY HELD FOR THEM, WITH RESPECT PARTICULARLY TO ARTICLES IV, V AND VI. HE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN THAT MUCH OF THIS DISILLUSIONMENT AND FRUSTRATION WOULD BE REFLECTED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS AT THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE. HE DID NOT RULE OUT THAT THE INDIAN ACTION, IF LEFT LARGELY UNCHALLENGED, MIGHT VERY WELL LEAD SOME NPT PARTIES TO RECONSIDER THE VALIDITY OF THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY. ONLY STRONG AND CLEAR ACTION TO MEET THE INDIAN CHALLENGE, ABOVE ALL ON THE PART OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS, COULD STOP THE DRIFT AWAY FROM THE NPT.

4. HE FELT SPECIFICALLY THAT THE INDIAN ACTION WOULD  
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BE MAJOR NEW INHIBITION IN PROCESS OF SECURING MORE ADHERENTS TO NPT. POSSIBILITY OF ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY BY SUCH COUNTRIES AS PAKISTAN, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, ISRAEL WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED-- POSSIBLY ALSO JAPAN (UNLESS THE US PUSHED MORE VIGOROUSLY THAN IT HAD TO DATE). IN THE CASE OF ITALY, HE FELT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SEIZE ON THIS NEW EXCUSE TO DELAY RATIFICATION IF NOT TO DROP THE IDEA ALTOGETHER.

HE THOUGHT ALSO THAT ONE WOULD NOW SEE A NEW INTEREST, PARTICULARLY IN NON-NPT STATES, IN THE PURCHASE OR INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL URANIUM FUELED RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS, NOW THAT THEIR OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE AS PLUTONIUM PRODUCERS WAS MADE CLEAR BY THE INDIAN EXAMPLE. HE CONJECTURED RATHER WRYLY THAT DESPITE THE DILEMMA POSED FOR THEM BY THE INDIAN EXPLOSION, CANADIANS MIGHT NOW CAPTURE A LOT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR THEIR CANDU NATURAL URANIUM REACTOR. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO WATCH THE FUTURE ATTITUDE OF, FOR EXAMPLE, IRAN, A COUNTRY WHICH OBVIOUSLY MUST HAVE BEEN DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY THE INDIAN TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENT AND SUCCESS IN BOLSTERING ITS POWER AND PRESTIGE IN ITS REGION AND THE WORLD. HE CONJECTURED THAT MANY COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SHUNNED RATIFICATION OF THE NPT FOR VARIOUS REASONS MIGHT NOW TURN TO INDIA FOR TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE. HE DID NOT RULE OUT THAT SOME MIGHT ULTIMATELY ATTEMPT TO PURCHASE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE FROM INDIA FOR "PEACEFUL PURPOSES".

5. EKLUND ALSO DREW CONNECTION BETWEEN BLOW TO NPT RESULTING FROM FAILURE US AND SOVS TO REACT TO INDIAN SHOT, AND FUTURE OF IAEA. REAL BASIS FOR AGENCY'S EXISTENCE, HE SAID, WAS POLITICAL ONE, EMBODIED IN ITS SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM. AGENCY'S TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND OTHER ACTIVITIES, WHILE IMPORTANT, COULD HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN OTHER WAYS AND BY OTHER INSTITUTIONS. THEIR IMPORTANCE IN IAEA PROGRAM IS THAT THEY BALANCE AND INSURE WIDER SUPPORT FOR THE UNIQUE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS OPERATION. IF SUPPORT FOR THE NPT FALTERS, HUMES

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FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4428  
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USMISSION USUN  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 4657

PARIS FOR AMB TAPE

SAID EKLUND, SO WILL THE SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM. US AND SOVS SHOULD BEAR THIS IN MIND AS THEY CONTEMPLATE HOW TO RESPOND TO INDIA'S NUCLEAR CHALLENGE TO NPT. ABOVE ALL USG, WHICH PROVIDED THE IMPETUS FOR CREATION OF THE AGENCY, AND INTRODUCED AND DEVELOPED THE SAFEGUARDS CONCEPT, BOTH IN THE AGENCY'S STATUTE AND THE NPT.

6. EKLUND SAID HE HAD BEEN SEARCHING FOR WAYS IN WHICH HE AND THE AGENCY MIGHT ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO THIS "NEW AND SEVERE BLOW TO THE NPT" BUT HAD DECIDED THAT A STATEMENT ON HIS PART IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG WORDS AND ACTIONS FROM MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON WOULD NOT HELP AND MIGHT EVEN EXACERBATE. HE HAD CALLED IN INDIAN CONFIDENTIAL

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AMBASSADOR JAIPAL BEFORE TALKING TO ME AND HAD EXPRESSED HIS DEEP CONCERN, QUOTING INTER ALIA THE CANADIAN AND SWEDISH REACTIONS TO JAIPAL. JAIPAL HAD STRESSED THAT THE INDIAN ACTION SHOULD HAVE COME AS NO SURPRISE. IT HAD BEEN A MATTER OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THAT INDIA WAS DEVELOPING A CAPABILITY FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AS A POTENTIAL MEANS TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN MINERAL RESOURCES. THERE HAD BEEN NO SECRETS IN THIS REGARD. JAIPAL STRESSED INDIAN POLICY STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO PEACEFUL USES OF THE ATOM AND CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT INDIA WOULD NOT DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY. JAIPAL WOULD NOT ACCEPT EKLUND'S POINT THAT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY REQUIRED FOR A PEACEFUL VERSUS THAT FOR A MILITARY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE. JAIPAL ADDED, INTERESTINGLY, A COMMENT THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HAD FAILED TO PROVIDE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SERVICES TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD, AND AN IMPLICATION THAT THIS WAS JUSTIFICATION FOR INDIA'S GOING IT ALONE,

PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF INDIA'S NEED TO PUT TO PRODUCTIVE USES ITS LARGE INVESTMENTS IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY. ACCORDING TO EKLUND'S ACCOUNT, EKLUND RIDICULED THIS ARGUMENT POINTING OUT THAT INDIA COULD NOT HAVE DEVELOPED THE SOPHISTICATION TO EXPLODE ANYTHING OTHER THAN A DIRTY DEVICE IN CONTRAST TO RELATIVELY "CLEAN DEVICES WITH LOW RADIO ACTIVE RELEASES WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED BY US AND SOVS. EVEN THESE SOPHISTICATED DEVICES RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY TO WHICH INDIA WAS A PARTY, AND SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TREATY HAD CREATED GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT FEASIBILITY OF MANY TYPES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. EKLUND SAID HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET FROM JAIPAL (OR ANY OTHER SOURCE) A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REAL REASONS WHY INDIA HAD ELECTED TO TAKE THIS DAMAGING ACTION AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME. HE COULD ONLY CONJECTURE THAT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAD EVEN MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAN HE HAD ASSUMED WITH RESPECT TO THE MORALE OF ITS POPULATION.

7. EKLUND ENDED WITH AN ALMOST ANGUISHED APPEAL FOR ACTION ON THE PART OF THE US AND OF THE USSR TO TURN  
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THE INDIAN ACTION INTO A POSITIVE ATTEMPT TO SALVAGE THE NPT. WE DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WHAT COULD BE DONE IN TERMS OF AGENCY ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OR OTHER AGENCY ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NPT. WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD EXPLORE THIS MATTER FURTHER, BUT EKLUND FOUND IT DIFFICULT (AS DOES MISSION) TO CONTEMPLATE APPLYING SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE BOARD OF GOVERNORS APPROVAL, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE AGENCY MEMBERSHIP AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS OF ITS STATUTE. ALL THE MORE REASON, SAID EKLUND THAT THE ADVANCED NUCLEAR COUNTRIES SHOULD AGREE ON OTHER FORMS OF COMMON ACTION WHICH WOULD NOT HARM THE IAEA OR BRING ITS SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM UNDER HEAVIER ATTACK. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION, ONE OF WHICH SHOULD BE TO PUSH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR AGREEMENT AMONG NUCLEAR EXPORTER STATES TO FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 3(2)(B) OF THE NPT. EKLUND ENDORSED SUCH A MOVE, SAYING IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO LET OTHER NON-NPT PARTIES KNOW QUICKLY THAT THEIR ACCESS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND KNOW-HOW WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THEIR NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE TREATY.

8. EKLUND ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO REITERATE HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE DELAY IN ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE

TEST BAN TREATY. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE DECISION OF MUCH OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD TO SUPPORT OR CONDEMN THE INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. WITHOUT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN HE FELT THAT SANCTIONS TAKEN AGAINST INDIA, OR OTHER SUPPORTIVE ACTIONS BY NPT PARTIES, WOULD ONLY BE STOP-GAP MEASURES, ESSENTIAL AT THE MOMENT BUT NOT NECESSARILY PRODUCING THE BASIS FOR A GENUINE AND LONG-TERM SUPPORT FOR THE NPT AMONG A LARGE SEGMENT OF BOTH ADHERENTS AND NON-ADHERENTS.

8. DEPT MAY WISH SUGGEST FURTHER DISSEMINATION.PORTER

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Subject:** INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST - REACTION BY IAEA DG EKLUND PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR TAPE  
**TAGS:** PFOR, TECH, IN, IAEA, (TAPE), (EKLUND)  
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